Introduction
For a long time, fertility in Sweden remained relatively stable, with successive generations having around two children on average. Since around 2010, however, fertility has declined markedly and continuously. This development is not unique to Sweden, and, unhelpfully for policymakers looking for a fix, the usual explanations do not hold up.
What explains this change? In From Relatively High to Declining Fertility Rates: What Happened in Sweden?, prepared within the Swedish Government’s inquiry A Future with Children, I examine the factors behind this decline and what they may mean for policy. The aim was to describe the changing fertility patterns in the country, examine the factors that may help explain them, and consider their implications for policy.
The findings point to five concrete priorities. The first two are about protecting and refocusing what already exists. The other three concern what government should now track, investigate and plan for, so that future decisions on benefits and programmes are built on a clearer picture of what is actually driving the decline.
1. Preserve the foundations of Sweden’s family policy
Individual taxation, income-related parental leave and well-developed childcare have long allowed Swedes to combine employment and parenthood, and these structures remain intact. The fertility decline is not evidence that the model has failed. Policymakers should resist pressure to dismantle or radically overhaul it in response to the recent numbers: the problem lies elsewhere, and the risk is reforming the part of the system that still works.
2. Redirect policy focus to first births, not family size
The defining feature of Sweden’s recent fertility decline is fewer people becoming parents at all. The likelihood of having a second or third child among those who have already become parents has changed much less. The central demographic shift is therefore not towards smaller families among parents, but towards fewer people becoming parents in the first place.
This change is particularly visible among people who are already living in cohabiting relationships. The decline in fertility cannot be explained by a decline in cohabitation itself. Rather, childless cohabiting couples have become less likely to make the transition to parenthood, as well as less likely to make other long-term commitments such as marriage. Understanding this change in the behaviour of people who are already in relationships is therefore central to understanding Sweden’s new fertility pattern.
3. Pay closer attention to fertility intentions, not just birth statistics
Fewer childless people in relationships now say they definitely plan to have children; more report uncertainty, or expect to remain childless. Following intentions, not just outcomes, should therefore become a standing part of how Sweden monitors its demographic trends. The Swedish Generations and Gender Surveys already provide an important basis for doing so, and show particularly striking changes among childless cohabiting women and men.
4. Take the wider social environment seriously
The fertility decline has coincided with a broader social transformation affecting younger generations, including greater global uncertainty, the expansion of social media, increased political polarisation, declining trust in institutions and science, and rising mental ill-health.
Survey evidence suggests that people who are more concerned about a range of external uncertainties are somewhat less likely to plan to become parents, while mental health is also relevant to fertility intentions. None of these factors can be identified as a single cause of the fertility decline, and their precise relationships remain unclear. They nevertheless point to important areas for further research into the changing conditions surrounding family formation.
5. Prepare for the possibility of persistently low fertility
For nearly a century, fertility among successive generations in Sweden remained remarkably stable at around 1.9–2.0 children per woman. Periods of higher and lower fertility largely reflected changes in the timing of childbearing: people had children earlier or later, but the eventual number of children and the proportion remaining childless changed relatively little.
The current decline appears different, with cohorts now of reproductive age showing signs of both lower fertility and increasing childlessness. There is therefore significant reason to expect more lasting consequences than in previous periods of declining fertility, a possibility reflected in Statistics Sweden’s downward revision of its long-term fertility assumption from around 1.9 to around 1.7 children per woman.